



GA-1

DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY



LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Esteemed Participants,

My name is Deniz Özkuş and it gives me immense pride to serve you as the Secretary-General of Model United Nations Turkey Conference 2017. It is a privilege to welcome you all to the 13th edition of MUNTR on behalf of our Director-General Mr. Barış Demir and our dedicated Academic and Organization Teams. The twelve-year-old legacy of innovation fueled our vision of MUNTR and our teams worked tirelessly in order to realize that vision.

Adopting the theme of ‘Harmony and Diversity’, our aim is to form and expand your understanding of tolerance through compromising negotiation processes in order to battle the increasing radicalism around the globe. Our committees will allow you, the participants, to discover the benefits of mutuality while teaching the diplomatic status quo and how to improve it.

Model United Nations Turkey 2017 Conference was realized by dedicated, innovative and disciplined individuals, the Secretariat. A gentleman who is specializing on the relations, that define international policies and those define the analytical understanding of the universe will oversee the General Assembly First Committee. The guardian angel, Under-Secretary-General Mr. Ali Berk İdil. We thoroughly analyzed the conflict zones in order to give you the best guideline on how to repair the lives of those we have forgotten. I advise you to assimilate the knowledge brought to you. I am looking forward to meeting you all in Antalya, on 6th of March.

Sincerely,

Devrim Deniz Özkuş

The Structure and Functions of the General Assembly of the United Nations

General Assembly of the United Nations, from now on will be referred as the General Assembly or the GA, has been one of the most central organs of the United Nations since its foundation in 1945 regarding the Charter of the United Nations (UN).ⁱ As the chief policymaking and representative organ of the UN, General Assembly works with the cooperation of all the 193 member states of the United Nations.ⁱⁱ Even this full and extensive understanding of participation alone, proves that the General Assembly is essentially the body of the United Nations that should be the main decision making platform. Codification of international law is also contributed by the General Assembly.ⁱⁱⁱ

Basically, the General Assembly provides recommendations to States on various topics and according to the general policies it adopts, it has taken decisions so far, that have affected many people all around the world.^{iv} A more detailed investigation of the functions of the General Assembly is done specific to the First Committee – Disarmament and International Security (DISEC); as it will be more relevant to the topic for all intents and purposes. The Charter of United Nations determines and defines the boundaries, responsibilities and the general structure of the GA, specifically in its Chapter IV which includes the Articles 9 to 22.^v

It is important to emphasize that the GA is a relatively more democratic, if not the most, body of the UN and the voting procedure is the strongest proof for this statement. The Article 18 of the Charter clearly suggests that each Member State will have one vote and decisions on important questions usually requires a two third majority.^{vi} Bearing these in mind, it is easily observed that the GA is differentiated by its democratic characteristics from some other main bodies of the UN, such as the Security Council in which five permanent members do enjoy a right to veto.

Functions and the Responsibilities of DISEC

DISEC which stands for the Disarmament and International Security Committee, is also referred as the First Committee. It aims to provide solutions to ever changing global challenges and threats to the world peace.^{vii} This function and essential aim is a direct result of the Charter. Sub article 1 of

the Article 11 states that: *“The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.”* Considering this clear mandate, DISEC is neither solely nor mainly, however critically responsible from the international security. However, one should bear in mind that GA committees, including DISEC do not have the power of absolute ruling over the regulations and individual decisions of member states. Therefore, DISEC’s responsible is of great importance considering that does hold a limited and balanced power to deal with issues that are crucial for the international security and peace. One other important aspect of DISEC is that, it regularly gathers once a year, like the other GA committees; which makes DISEC’s decisions long termed and far reaching considering the time period between the assemblies.

Agenda Item I: Reforming the Humanitarian Corridor to Gaza Strip

I. Background and General Overview of the Region

The region of Palestine is one of the first inhabited regions in the world by a civilization, in this case a number of civilizations.^{viii} Due to this fact the region acted as the birth place of the religions Christianity and Judaism, in addition as a result of its geographical position it become widely populated by Muslim communities, such as but not limited to Umayyads, Abbasids, Seljuqs, Fatimids and from the early 16th Century, Palestinians.^{ix} However, since the region and the city of Jerusalem has the role of "*holy lands*", it faced great conflicts throughout history.^x The habit of conflict in the region started with the Crusades which lasted for 196 years (1095 to 1291).^{xi} During the Crusades the region changed hands for several times and the ongoing conflict resulted in mass migrations to and from the region, in which the populations of Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities changed drastically.^{xii} After the Ottoman occupation of the region, Suleiman The Great built the current walls around the city of Jerusalem leaving out the region of Silwan outside the walls.^{xiii} Following this the Jewish population increased and in 1839 Moses Montefiore and Muhammed Pasha of Egypt signed an agreement which granted the Jewish community to establish 100 to 200 villages in the Syrian State of Ottoman Empire.^{xiv} Jerusalem and the surrounding area was considered inside the State of Syria at the time. In return the Jewish community settled in and around Jerusalem.^{xv}

The late 19th Century witnessed the birth of Zionism.^{xvi} Half of the Jewish population of the world was settled in Russian territory and although they were granted citizenship rights they were still being persecuted in Russia.^{xvii} Following the examples of Slavic nationalists, a separate Jewish

nationalist movement started in Russia and millions of Russian Jews that migrated from Russia (mostly to America) carried the seeds of this nationalism with them.^{xviii} During these migrations a Jewish community was founded near Jaffa.^{xix} In this settlement, a French Jewish association founded schools that educated the inhabitants in order to be self-sufficient rather than living on donations that came from the Europe.^{xx} Throughout three decades the migration to Jaffa continued.^{xxi} New migrants started small agricultural settlements and slowly increased their population.^{xxii} With the revival of the Hebrew language, Jewish migration to the region intensified. By 1890 Jewish community was a majority in Jerusalem.^{xxiii}

In the year 1896 Theodor Herzl published *The Jewish State*, in which he argued that the solution to the growing antisemitism in Europe was an independent Jewish state.^{xxiv} With the creation of the Zionist Organization and the First Zionist Congress, Zionist society manifested that their aim is to “*establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law*”.^{xxv} However, the suspicious approach of the Ottoman Government towards the Zionist movement prevented any further progress during the time being.^{xxvi}

After the mass migration of the Jewish populations around the world to Palestine, the Arab Revolt occurred in Palestine between 1936 and 1939.^{xxvii} With millions of Jews trying to leave Europe, states around the world closed their borders.^{xxviii} In response to this much of the refugee flow was directed to Palestine.^{xxix} As a result, Britain closed the borders of Palestine to the Jewish immigrants and proposed ‘The White Paper’ which suggested Palestine should be governed by a joint government of Arabs and Jews.^{xxx} Both parties rejected this proposal resulting in an escalation of the tensions in the region.^{xxxi}

Most of Jewish people who escaped the Holocaust volunteered to fight in the Allied armies.^{xxxii} 200,

000 Jewish people alone were listed as Soviet army casualties during the Second World War.^{xxxiii} The veterans who survived the Second World War, then fought for the establishment of the State of Israel.^{xxxiv} Shortly after the war a survey showed that 95% of Jewish population scattered around the world wished to migrate to Palestine.^{xxxv} With these events the leadership of the Zionist movement passed to the Jewish Agency in Palestine which was strictly anti-British at the time and in the diaspora the American Jews.^{xxxvi}

a. Formation of the State of Israel

With the request of the United Kingdom on 2 April 1947, the United Nations General Assembly created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.^{xxxvii} The representatives from the committee visited Palestine in order to address the ‘Question of Palestine’ as it was known during the time.^{xxxviii} The Arab High Committee refused to join the meetings. As a result, the commission only met with the Zionist leaders in Palestine.^{xxxix}

The majority of the Special Committee reported that a separate Arab State, a Jewish State and the city of Jerusalem was the optimum solution to the question.^{xl} With the proposal of the Resolution 181 the report was adopted by the majority of the General Assembly.^{xli} However, neither the British Government nor the United Nations Security Council took any action in order to implement the decision of the General Assembly. The British withdrawal from the region ended on March 1949, right after the end of the Civil War in Mandatory Palestine.^{xlii}

b. Arab Israeli Wars

After the official formation of the State of Israel, United States of America and the Soviet Socialist Republics Union recognized the state.^{xliii} Following this coalition of Arab League nations marched into Palestine by the time Israel Defense Force (IDF) was formed.^{xliv} Although the Arabic forces gained enormous amounts of ground during the initial fighting, IDF retaliated with organized attacks and were able to push the Arabic forces back to their infill points.^{xlv} After the peace agreement was signed with the coalition forces Israel's current borders were formed which is known as the 'Green Line'.^{xlvi} Although a peace agreement was signed the conflict between Israel and the Arab States which oppose the formation of a Jewish state did not come to an end.^{xlvii} The fighting re-escalated in the early 1950s and late 1960s. In which all the State of Israel prevailed as the victor and kept the Green Line.^{xlviii}

c. Hamas

Hamas, an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, was formed as a political party in Palestine with an armed wing known as Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.^{xlix} In the legislative elections of 2006, Hamas gained the majority of the seats in the parliament.¹ This gave Hamas the political power.^{li} Because of the clashes between Hamas and the former Fatah party, Hamas' rule and borders were compressed into the Gaza territory by the economic blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt, which meant Hamas held no governance power over the West Bank.^{lii} Hamas conducted rocket attacks on Israeli regions in retaliation of the Israeli military operations in the Gaza strip, in which Israelis claimed the operations were in retaliation to the rocket attacks.^{liii}

d. 2014 Gaza Conflict

In response to rocket attacks and tunnel raids that were allegedly conducted by Hamas, Israeli air force started their operations over the Gaza Strip on 12 July followed by a ground assault on 17 July.^{liv} Israeli officials stated that the aim of the operations was to destroy the rocket launch sites and tunnel system Hamas was using.^{lv} Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip which resulted in heavy fighting and heavier casualties. Palestinian civilian casualties reached 1,000 by the date 27 July.^{lvi} On 3 August Israel pulled out its ground units from Gaza strip after successfully destroying 32 tunnel entries and numerous rocket launch sites.^{lvii} The Gaza Strip then kept besieged and blockaded by the IDF, which is referred to as the “*the biggest open air prison in the world*”.^{lviii}

II. Blockade Over Gaza Strip and West Bank and the Affects

After the legislative elections of 2006, Hamas rose to power and increased the intensity of their attacks against Israel Defense Force and Israeli residential areas.^{lix} In response to the increased intensity of the attacks, Israel and Egypt formed a blockade around the Gaza Strip and West Bank controlling every aspect of transportation (land, sea air) to and from the region.^{lx} This act was conducted in order to limit the rocket attacks and prevent Hamas from gathering military supplies.^{lxi} The blockade also resulted in the limitation of Hamas' political power over the whole region on of Palestine. United Nations Secretary-General condemned the blockade and stating concerns over the humanitarian aid supply to the region.^{lxii} A United Nations fact finding mission that dates to 2009 reached the conclusion that, the blockade was carrying out a total maltreatment of the population in the region, not just Hamas forces and therefore illegal.^{lxiii} Nevertheless, Israel refused to lift the blockade.^{lxiv}

Israel allows the basic goods entry to the region. However, the entry of any kind of fuel, alongside

with several shipments of fruits, vegetables, wheat, sugar and dairy products are not given the right of passage into the Gaza Strip.^{lxv} The passage of live stock is never permitted. The United Nations Human Rights Counsel and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported several times that shipments of books, jam, musical instruments, paper, shampoo were denied access by the IDF, stating that these products can be used in order to smuggle military equipment in to the Gaza Strip.^{lxvi}

In 2007 Israeli Cabinet also increased the limitations over the travel restrictions to and from the region.^{lxvii}

In 2010 Israeli Navy seized three flotillas of aid shipments which were denied access beforehand.^{lxviii}

Starting in 2010 Israeli Government began to ease the restrictions and the blockade itself. However, it has been reported by the UNHRC that the aid into the region was still not enough.^{lxix}

III. Humanitarian Corridor and the Rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank

The Gaza Strip and the West bank are torn apart by decades of fighting and years of isolation. A United Nations commission reached the conclusion that because of the transportation restriction Gaza Strip may become uninhabitable by the year 2020.^{lxx} The security measures imposed by the Israel Defense Force and the ongoing conflict and clashes between Israelis and Palestinians.^{lxxi} The unemployment rates reached nearly 50% and the poverty levels reached a critical level which may transform into risen hunger rates.^{lxxii} The aids received after the easing of the blockade in 2014 and 2015 have fallen short.^{lxxiii} There are nearly 100, 000 internally displaced people who shelter since

their houses were destroyed during clashes. However, the much needed construction materials and vehicles are denied access to the region by the Israeli blockade.^{lxxiv}

Ross Mountain, a journalist for the Guardian, emphasizes his concerns as follows:

“As the political maneuvering proceeds, there are ways to ameliorate the suffering of Palestinians. Donors can start by not placing political conditions on their assistance and challenging every party, both Israeli and Palestinian, that delays, controls or misuses aid. They should also avoid short-term funding cycles and grant humanitarian organizations the flexibility they need to implement long-term programmes to meet long-standing needs.”^{lxxv}

Furthermore, the energy consumption of the Gaza Strip is being regulated by the Israeli officials whom are limiting the electricity transfer to a minimum.^{lxxvi} In addition, the telecommunication lines are still under repair and with the current repair rate, reaching full capacity on telecommunications is expected to take seven more years.^{lxxvii}

When considering the security, there is no active and conventional law enforcement unit in the region.^{lxxviii} However, the military wing of Hamas, Izz al-Dinn al-Qassam Brigades are responsible for enforcing law inside the strip.^{lxxix} Due to the lack of proper law enforcement units, raids, murder, theft are rapidly becoming a reality in Gaza.

There are nearly 1, 300, 000 Palestinian refugees that suffered from the conflicts.^{lxxx} The total number of IDPs reached the critical number of 221, 000.^{lxxxii} More than 50% of the residential buildings in the Gaza Strip has been destroyed by the heavy fighting that took place during the four major military campaigns into the region.^{lxxxii} This resulted in more than 221, 000 internally displaced people inside the territory.^{lxxxiii} Therefore, one of the primary needs in the strip is

construction material and vehicles. However, the immense number of houses destroyed means the construction project that must be conducted in the strip, is a colossal project. There is a large need of the material nevertheless the project must be planned in a manner that 30-40% of the internally displaced persons must be provided with a shelter within two years in order to prevent an escalation of the unrest among residents of the Gaza Strip.

Another aspect of the reconstruction in the Gaza Strip is reforming a self-sustaining economy. A self-sufficient economy, by terminology, means adopting and implementing the potential agricultural activities, a production of needed materials or excess production of certain products in order to create an export market to create an equilibrium between export and import and a sufficient energy production.^{lxxxiv} Furthermore, the region desperately needs stability and without the creation of job opportunities, it is impossible persuade the common fighter aged Palestine to cease violent activities.

Foremost important long and short term solution is the formation of the sense and the reality of security inside the Gaza Strip. With the current rate of violence in the Strip it would be uncommon to expect the safe travel of the population or the aid packages or the construction material.

a. Reconstruction

The planned rate of reconstruction in the Gaza Strip could not be met due to several reasons:

The much needed construction material is granted access through only one checkpoint from the Israeli borderline due to the security concerns, only the 40% of the materials are able to find their ways to the construction sites scattered around the strip.^{lxxxv} Furthermore, the Hamas is unable to

deliver the construction workers with payment, therefore mass resignations have occurred from the beginning of the reconstruction projects.^{lxxxvi} Finally, the promised donations are not reaching its destinations, since the commissions from the donor states still report that the “Gaza Strip is not safe enough to carry out the efforts.”^{lxxxvii} With Further evaluation the unsafe environment has halted the reconstruction efforts. Only the 9 percent of the fully damaged houses were rebuilt and due to the IDF operations and militant presence in those districts the displaced people could not be given shelter at those locations.^{lxxxviii} The format of bureaucracy is very complicated for the reconstruction funding which is explained as:

“Moreover, construction materials only enter Gaza through one border crossing and must be cleared by layers of bureaucracy. As Omar Shaban—director of Pal-Think, a research institution in Gaza—explained, money for Gaza reconstruction is funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, which transfers it to the U.N. office in Gaza. The United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials, and the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat)—an Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense—must approve the names on the list. The U.N. then distributes construction materials. Shaban emphasized that the bureaucratic nature of this process has slowed reconstruction considerably, adding that the process isn’t transparent enough, since neither Hamas officials nor members of Gaza’s civil society oversee any aspect of aid distribution.”^{lxxxix}

b. Law Enforcement and Security

Ahmad Jabari argues that Hamas had a monopoly over arms control inside the Gaza Strip after disarming Fatah supporters, however by the year 2010 Hamas started to lose that domination over arms, which followed by a worsening of the security concerns.^{xc} The report from the Independent

Commission for Human Rights stated that “nearly systematic human rights abuses” by Hamas, Ramallah and Israeli officials have reached a critical level.^{xcv} Opposition against Hamas is facing heavy oppression from the supporters of the administration and from the administration itself.^{xcvii} Hamas has kept opening windows for the Islamic Jihad Movement to conduct raids and rocket attacks in certain times. Hamas' utilization of the other Islamic militants is causing security gaps. After the conflict times these militants gain sociological and military power which then contests the administration. The loop of conflict inside the Gaza Strip is caused by this action. It becomes harder to control a militant group after granting them the freedom of action. They become able to start their recruitment campaigns and increase their radius of influence, followed by a power vacuum. In one of these temporary power vacuums the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant gained a foothold in the region.^{xcviii} Various Islamic group announced their allegiance to the Islamic State inside the Strip.^{xcix} This caused a multiplication of the security concerns. At the time being Hamas does not have control over the militants of these various Islamic groups. There have been various reports of clashes, at one side the Palestinian Police and armed members of the Fatah Movement, and armed Hamas supporters at the opposing side. However, the local severely lack the proper weaponry, training and supplies to fight such an organized opposition. Officials from the United States Armed Forces defines the Palestinian Police force as “*divided, weak, overstuffed, demotivated and under armed*”.^{xc} In contrast the non-state actors like Hamas are well-armed. For the peace talks to move forward the establishment of security is essential, by any means.^{xcvi}

c. Disarmament of the Radical Groups That Operate in the Region and Effect the Region's Composition

“Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW): revolver and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems; portable launcher of anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADs); and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm.”^{xcvii}

Through the tunnel network created by the Palestinians for smuggling purposes, arms flow to the region has been a common occurrence since the legislative elections of 2006.^{xcviii} No matter the volume there has been a constant arms flow in to the Strip and the Arab Spring fueled this flow. Radical and rebel groups seized most of the government small arms stockpiles during the times of turmoil and although most of the affected Arab States formed effective controls of their stockpiles right after the Spring the volume of small arms captured by unknown bodies, is immense.^{xcix}

“The Arab Turmoil has dramatically increased the arms of rebellious non-state actors in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Non-state actors have acquired weapons through state sponsorship, stealing and looting, arms trade and self-production. Securing a steady flow of arms and ammunition allows non-state actors to sustain unbalanced conflicts against a much stronger state’s forces. For example, until recently, the Palestinian Hamas and the smaller, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) enjoyed advanced Iranian weaponry that was smuggled by land and sea.”

These unknown bodies conduct the illicit trade of the captured SALW arsenal into the various regions of the Middle East, including the Gaza Strip. The weak governance inside the Gaza strip allows the SALWs to have a free passage into the region and find their selves in the hands of radical groups.^c The acquired weapons include mortars, rocket batteries and MANPADs.^{ci} If the number of

these high-tech weaponry increases inside the Strip another military turmoil would be inevitable, according to the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.^{cii} In addition, due to the ongoing blockade and isolation of the region it is becoming inaccessible also for the Palestinian authorities, which in return means weakened control over the arms flow inside the region by the Palestinian Officials.^{ciii} By the same token Israeli Defense Force is denying to grant any help regarding the control of illicit arms trade, nevertheless Israeli authorities are conducting their own missions in order to deny weapons and supplies to the radical groups as well as the Egyptian Army which started their ongoing counter-smuggling operations against the Gaza Strip in late 2011.^{civ} However, the efforts these three authorities (Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian) proved to come short, due to the fact that the rate of smuggling is too altitudinous for separate operations which lack the core principle of intelligence sharing.^{cv}

IV. United Nations Resolutions, Relevant Treaties, Commissions, Committees and Events

From the very beginning of its creation with the San Francisco Conference of 1945, the United Nations and all of its principle bodies has been involved in this problem through several resolutions, peace talks, formed commissions, conferences and conventions. The ever shifting nature of the problem has caused several of these actions to become outdated. However, when forming a theoretical approach and case examinations taking the following into consideration is imperative.

a. The United Nations Resolutions and Documents Concerning Palestine and Israel

- Security Council Resolution (8 January 2009, S/RES/1860): Calls for the immediate, durable and lasting ceasefire which will be followed by the withdrawal of Israeli Defense Force from the Gaza Strip.^{cvi}

- Security Council Resolution (16 December 2008, S/RES/1850): Declaration of support to Annapolis peace process.^{cvi}
- Security Council Resolution (24 September 2002, S/RES/1435): Calls the Israeli Defense Force to cease all operations in Ramallah.^{cvi}
- Security Council Presidential Statement (26 September 2012, S/PRST/2012/20): Statement calls for and appreciates cooperation between the United Nations, Israeli Government and Palestinian Authority.^{cix}
- Security Council Presidential Statement (28 July 2014, S/PRST/2014/13): The presidential statement that calls for parties to respect International Humanitarian Law. ^{cx}
- United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution (22 June 2015, A/HRC/29/52): The general report on the Gaza Conflict of 2014.^{cx}
- United Nations Human Rights Council (3 July 2015, A/HRS/RES/29/25): Resolution concerning the human rights violations in Palestine.^{cxii}
- General Assembly Resolution (29 November 2012, A/RES/67/19): Granting non-member observer state status to Palestine.^{cxiii}
- General Assembly Report (11 August 2014, A/69/301): Report by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Palestine.^{cxiv}

b. Treaties and Peace Talks Concerning Palestine

-The Accord signed between Vatican and Palestine.

With the accord Vatican become the first western administration to recognize the State of Palestine.^{cxv}

-Ongoing peace talks have a tendency to be ceased by either side of the talks from time to time.

Which in return creates a fragile nature for the peace progress.^{cxvi}

c. Committees, Commissions and Conventions

–The Gaza Commission of Inquiry: Formed in order to detect and recommend on the war crimes committed by the either side of the conflict during the entirety of the turmoil.^{cxvii}

–United Nations Human Rights Council: The United Nations Human Rights Council regularly presents reports to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon and the Security council on the situation of human rights in Palestine.^{cxviii}

V. Major Parties Involved in the Problem of Palestine

a. Hamas

Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) started to gain political power with the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Middle East. With the legislative elections of 2006, Hamas sealed its political influence with seats in the Palestinian Parliament.^{cxix} Hamas directed most of the fighting efforts against the Israeli Defense Forces until the early 2015.^{cxx} Hamas used its Islamic and political influence in order to direct other Islamic groups in their fight and attacks against Israeli Forces.^{cxxi} Directing of other Islamic groups led to the escalation of the tensions in the region many times.

b. Israeli Defense Force

Israeli Defense Force is the general name of the land, air and navy military power of the State of Israel.^{cxxii} IDF differs from most of the world's armies in different aspects, most widely known differentiation is their method of conscription.^{cxxiii} Every man and woman is conscripted into the Israeli Defense Force at the age 18, which means the entirety of Israeli population over the age of 18 can be considered as reserves.^{cxxiv} Since Israel allegedly has an arsenal that can fully arm up to 2,5

million military personal.^{cxxv}

c. Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine

Formed in 1979 as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian Islamic Jihad is considered to be the second largest terrorist group by the United States State Department.^{cxxvi} The group strongly opposes the existence of the state of Israel and claims to be dedicated to form an Islamic Palestine State in the area that comprising Israel, Gaza and the West Bank.^{cxxvii} PIJ is conducting terrorist acts inside (assassination of an Israeli police officer, shooting of unarmed Israeli Army reservists, etc.) and outside (attacking a tourist bus that was carrying Israelis which resulted in deaths of 11 Israeli citizens, suicide bombing in Netanya, etc.).^{cxxviii} The group is in close association with the Syrian and Iranian Hezbollah.^{cxxix} The European Union, the United States of America, Canada and many other western nations classified the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as an organization involved in terrorist acts therefore a terrorist organization.^{cxxx}

d. Palestinian National Authority

Palestinian National Authority refers to the Palestinian Government presided by Mahmoud Abbas.^{cxxxii} Palestinian National Authority (PNA/PA) has gained a non-member observer state status in the United Nations General Assembly voting of the Resolution A/RES/67/19 and then received state status in the UNESCO.^{cxxxiii} Which, in return, means the Palestinian National Authority is considered as the legitimate diplomatic and governing body in Palestine.^{cxxxiii} All the peace talks and negotiations are directed towards the National Authority and its representatives.^{cxxxiv}

e. The Arab League

The Arab League is a unity of Arab States which advocates democracy, economic growth and security in the Arabic territories.^{cxxxv} Palestinian National Authority is a member of the Arab League.^{cxxxvi} Therefore, in the international arena defends the interests of the Palestinian Authority.^{cxxxvii} For instance, the Arab League called the United Nations Security Council to an urgent meeting right after Israel Defense Force commenced with the execution of Operation Protective Edge and also called for the airstrikes to be ceased immediately.^{cxxxviii} The advocacy of the Arab League is invaluable to the Palestinian National Authority.^{cxxxix}

f. Egypt

The fact that the Egypt is a neighboring state to Palestine, it is directly affected by the extremism and clashes in the region.^{cxl} The arms flow was directed from Egyptian territory until the borders were closed between Palestine and Egypt.^{cxli} Shortly after the closure of the borders Government of Egypt started conducting anti-smuggling operations against the illicit arms trade into the Gaza Strip.^{cxlii}

Egypt also negotiated with the Israeli Government in favor of the Palestinian National Authority with regards to the easing of the Israeli blockade.^{cxliii} Egypt is the only party in the conflict and the problem which has satisfactory diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Palestinian National Authority.^{cxliv}

VI. Possible Solutions

a. Durable Peace

The major factor that makes the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip burdensome is the reality and

effects of the ongoing conflict. The clashes in the region tend to ease and aggravate in an irregular manner.^{cxlv} The actions of the Islamic State, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and rarely Hamas causes the Israeli Defense Force to take retaliatory actions. In return, the financial aid and reconstruction efforts are brought to hold during the times of clashes. Therefore, a durable peace is imperative in order to fully expand the rehabilitation plans.

b. Disarmament of the Non-State Actors

Armed non-state actors are the primary reason of the ongoing violence in the Gaza Strip. For instance, when the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducts a terrorist act, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) retaliates and Hamas then retaliates this with rocket attacks to Israel, thus creating a loop of violence.^{cxlvi} The international community, with special emphasis on Israel and Palestinian National authority, must adopt a cooperative approach on the disarmament efforts of the non-state actors and individuals.

“Those militants who remain outside the system and refuse to recognize the authority of the state should be dealt with through direct force and legal means - apprehended by the security forces and brought to trial to face prosecution. This can only be done once the playing field is leveled for all parties. Many Palestinians, fed up with the lawlessness, will support such a confrontation if it is a part of a genuine effort to establish the rule of law.”^{cxlvii}

c. Training and Re-Equipping of the Palestinian Police

The local law enforcement units (local Palestinian police) are overstaffed, under-equipped and

demotivated, according to the United States Military Officials.^{cxlviii} The international efforts to bring peace must also be directed towards the training of the Palestinian law enforcement units in the manners of counter-terrorism and border control specifically.^{cxlix} Therefore, the disarmament and security measures can be eased for the Israeli Defense force and the Egyptian Military which in return will shorten the time needed for security establishment operations. In addition to training Palestinian law enforcement units lack the necessary equipment to fight and counter the non-state actors.^{cl}

d. Strengthening the Governance

Currently the Gaza Strip is isolated from the rest of the Palestinian National Authority. This causes dire step backs on the governance of the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian National Authority is unable to fully supply its law enforcement units inside the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the government departments in the Strip are having immense trouble establishing the sense and reality of law and order inside the Strip, due to the lack of material, personal and adequate infrastructure. The local government inside the Strip must be supported to a level that it is able operate and form order on its own, even with the existence of the isolation.

e. Ensuring the Full Flow of Basic Humanitarian Necessities

Israeli Government is denying passage to most of the humanitarian aid due to the concerns of the aid, becoming supplies for the armed non-state actors inside the Strip. A secure flow of food, clothing and shelter materials must be ensured to recover the population of the Gaza Strip from the devastating clashes. In order to achieve this goal, a secure corridor has to be established by the security forces. Without the escorts to the aid convoys it is unattainable to be certain of the arrival of the aid to the right and intended hands. The basic needs and the amount of those needs has to be

assessed by experts in order to have a one hundred percent effective humanitarian operation to the region. United Nations Human Rights Council is known to conduct such fact finding missions along with the other relevant bodies of the United Nations and other international organizations (such as but not limited to Amnesty International).

f. Shelter Reconstruction

VI The much needed reconstruction is either brought to a standstill or progressing very slowly inside the Gaza Strip due to a several factors.^{cli} First being the constant danger of conflict inside or near the construction sites. The second factor is the payment problems to the construction workers.^{clii} The promised payments could not be made because the international funding is stopping as a clash occurs. Firstly, the safety of the workers must be ensured, then the guaranteed payments must be delivered to resume the reconstruction efforts. Another issue is the lack of adequate amounts of construction vehicles and materials.^{cliii} Only a small portion of the needed vehicles and materials are in place for the constructions.^{cliv} A satisfactory amount of construction material flow has to be ensured and the much needed vehicles has to enter the Gaza Strip in order to perform the planned reconstruction projects that will shelter hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Palestinians.

VII. Conclusion

The situation inside the Gaza Strip has far-reaching effects. The United Nations and whole region of Middle East (and nature of conflict in the region) is directly affected by the circumstances inside the Gaza Strip, while the entirety of the politics, economics and many other factors of the global arena is indirectly influenced.

The negligence, ongoing conflict, radicalism (on both sides) and lack of sufficiency has kept the

conflict ongoing. In return, the conflict caused a huge percentage of the population to be internally displaced which created the perfect medium for instability. Human rights violations, violence and poverty became the nature of the Gaza strip. In addition, the elements brought by the Arab Spring ensured a constant flow of arms that fed and fueled the conflict and extremist movement.

It is the primary duty and purpose of General Assembly First Committee to ensure stability, disarmament, security and sufficient levels rehabilitation in the region. Although it is widely stated in this document that “conflict is the nature of the region” this is due to the fact that necessary and adequate steps have never been taken in order to secure an ever lasting peace. The parties involved in the conflict have seemingly opposing goals, however when the core of the missions are examined it is evident that they follow a similar perspective; security and stability. Therefore, it is beyond reasonable to assume a durable peace can be achieved via negotiations. Nevertheless, the nature, content and context of the negotiations are vital to achieve the intentions of the Secretary-General. The illicit arms trade must cease to cut of the lifeblood of the extremism. With extremism eradicated Israeli security concerns that put the blockade and isolation to the Gaza Strip in the first place will also be eradicated.

Furthermore the General Assembly First Committee must all the time keep in mind that the most effected group from the conflict is the civilian population. A path of increasing the life expectancy and quality has to followed.

The problem in the region has a dynamic feature, which means the circumstances drastically change daily. In conclusion, without a dynamic approach to a dynamic problem, expecting a durable solution is impossible.

The inclusion of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is also vital to the solution. The reports, fact finding missions and the actions of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Disarmament Commission, the International Criminal Police Organization and the Special Commission of Inquiry must be specially emphasized during solution process. These agencies carried out numerous actions on stopping the arms flow into the region, finding and prosecuting the illicit arms dealers, fact finding of human rights situation inside the Strip, reconstructing the houses that were demolished, housing the refugees, enforcing law, negotiating peace terms, and stopping the violence.

It is the DISEC's duty to find, negotiate and ratify terms of peace and security in the Gaza Strip in a dynamic and fundamental manner.

VIII. Points That a Resolution Should Cover

- Action plan to ensure the disarmament of the civilians and the non-state actors and prevention of the re-armament
- Means to create a cooperative basis for the solution of the problem, including the United Nations, Israel and Palestinian National Authority
- Measures to train and equip the Palestinian law enforcement units in cooperation with the Israeli Defense Force to ensure maximum effectiveness, followed by means to support the law enforcement

- Action to resume and maximize the reconstruction efforts, with special emphasis on delivery of the construction materials and vehicles
- Establishment of security for the construction workers
- Measures to ensure the one hundred percent delivery of the humanitarian aid directed into the Gaza Strip
- Improving the human resources directed to the region
- Establishment of a permanent peace between the opposing sides, followed by cooperation in order to guarantee the prevention of further conflict
- Improving the intelligence sharing between states and the United Nations
- Designation of the needed resources and goods divided to regions of the Gaza Strip
- Means to implement the sense of trust between the parties.
- Ways to increase the global awareness to the Palestinian humanitarian crisis.
- Means to support the neighboring states on border control and security implementation.

Agenda Item II: Restructuring of Post-Conflict Zones

I. Introduction

International conflicts and conflicts on a national scale have always been one of the most prominent threats to the world peace and international security. This premise is undoubtedly accepted by most of the international community. However, what must be acknowledged as a topic of at least equal importance is the restructuring of those conflict zones after the immediate danger passes in these zones. It is evident that conflict zones are inclined to be much more dangerous for the civilian population and without required precautions it is not very possible for the region to return to its initial situation. In order to reestablish peace throughout the world, not only the international community should put a stop to the ongoing conflicts but also it should be actively providing the optimum circumstances within post-conflict zones.

Optimum circumstances include many significant yet for the most of the time lacking qualities of the political, socio-cultural and economic situation of the region. Every region does need to have a certain set of conditions in order for the reconstruction and restructuring to begin and also every region does need many conditions to maintain the process. Although the initial required conditions and the conditions required for the maintenance of the progress is to a certain degree common, there is naturally a hierarchy based on priority and urgency.

Without its community which is able to restore all that it has lost during a conflict, a region is unfortunately very prone to many other conflicts. Without a healthy reconstruction, the causes that have made the conflict occur in the first place will not be eradicated and a repetition of the destructive process becomes inevitable. Moreover, the devastation of a second or third conflict is dramatically increased because of all the cumulating effects of physical and social destruction. That is the main reason why conflicts are such an important issue to today's international community. However, it is an epiphany of a much later age that the humankind has realized the essentiality of reconstructing the conflict zones as well as ending the conflict in a particular region. United

Nations, with its tradition of peacemaking and peacekeeping should be the main pillar of reconstructing efforts. This guide is aimed to give information about the reconstruction of the conflict zones very briefly.

II. Description of Post-Conflict Zones

Conflict could be defined as “fighting between two or more groups of people or countries”^{.clv} However this definition is a little vague to be useful within the context of international relations. Traditionally, in international relations, an international conflict is used to describe conflicts in which states or different groups in states are involved.^{.clvi} However, the term is increasingly used to also describe the situations in which two groups in a country are fighting for political, economic or social reasons.^{.clvii} In overall, a post-conflict zone is a zone in which a conflict occurred in the past. The word “post” simply refers that the mentioned conflict is passed. It can easily be said that, every territory, region or location -may it be a geographically, politically or specifically defined- that has been the center or a part of any conflict could be named as a “Post-Conflict Zone”. Since the focus of DISEC is to establish international peace and it is mainly practiced through the actions of governments, the conflicts that should be in the scope of the General Assembly should be conflicts on every level of nature such as political, military, economic, social, religious however its scope should be limited when it comes to the level of intensity of conflicts. There are functioning governments all around the world and it is not the duty of the United Nations to be involved in every single conflict, especially if it seems that it could be resolved through national measures. On the other hand, this does and should not relieve the United Nations, and particularly DISEC. There are hundreds of large scale conflicts globally and also there are hundreds of regions all around the world where reconstruction efforts are done however in a slow and sometimes in an ineffective fashion.

III. Aspects of Restructuring of Post-Conflict Zones

“Post-conflict reconstruction is broadly understood as a complex, holistic and

multidimensional process encompassing effort to simultaneously improve military (restoration of law and order), political (governance), economic (rehabilitation and development) and social conditions (justice and reconciliation).^{clviii}

It has been very well established that wars and conflicts leave conflict zones devastated and mostly unable for a community to develop and even live within it. One of the most important aspects of restructuring and reconstructing the conflict zones is the involvement of the local population since the process can only succeed if they are involved in it.^{clix} This aspect of reconstruction is particularly important given that United Nations and its bodies are entitled to respect local communities as well as the integrity of its Member States. Without the involvement of the local population all operations and efforts would only be artificial and unfortunately temporary.

Another essential topic that must be considered on the issue of reconstruction is the (re)establishment of a strong government. One of the most important task of a recovering region is to restore an effective and functioning government and also ensuring that the public trusts it.^{clx} Stabilization of the economy, ensuring safety and bringing peace to the region is not highly probable without the existence of the proponents and indicators of a strong administration such as but not limited to civil society, strong private sector and effective government institutions. *“Although weak governance and ineffective government are often the results of conflict, sometimes they are also its causes. Dissension tends to increase in societies where government fails to meet public needs and provide essential services or cannot solve basic development problems.”*^{clxi} This statement is important bearing in mind that restoring governmental organs is important not only in means of correcting an unpleasant consequence of a conflict but it is also a way of preventing further deepening of any unrest. As the sentence clearly suggests that governmental issues may also be the cause of a conflict they must be addressed with extensive and specific care. Post-conflict zones are inclined to become conflict zones once again due to their fragile status.

Economic development and stability is one of the other aspects that must be investigated further.

*“The economic dimension of post-conflict reconstruction usually involves tasks such as distribution of relief assistance, restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, reestablishment of social services, creation of appropriate conditions for the private sector development, and implementation of essential structural reforms for macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth.”^{clxii} DISEC is of course not responsible for economic development primarily however if it is believed that economic issues are triggering a conflict or vice versa, there is no reason for the First Committee should not be involved and take the necessary steps. *“Evidence shows that early attention to the fundamentals of economic growth increases the likelihood of successfully preventing a return to conflict and moving forward with renewed growth. It is critically important to heed this evidence and make early economic interventions an integral part of a comprehensive restructuring and stabilization program. While economic growth is not the sole solution to resolving post-conflict issues, it can clearly be a significant part of the solution.”^{clxiii} Economic stability is of course not something to be achieved in short term, especially in post-conflict zones and it can be reached through different efforts varying from infrastructure to increased rule of law. One of the most urgent tasks for the government in a post-conflict zone is to stabilize the relatively volatile economic conditions, and to increase economic growth in a way that would be beneficial to all levels of income.^{clxiv} This is also important from a perspective of security since none of the economic stability objectives could be maintained in the absence of a secure and peaceful environment.**

Post-conflict reconstruction and restructuring is also a struggle against vulnerability. In post-conflict zones, many social problems arise naturally including religious, political or even ethical problems may emerge. However, the most related social issue in the post-conflict zones is the vulnerability of particular groups. *“More difficult to quantify, or to assess its long-term impact, is the effect of radical changes in the social cohesion of a war torn country: its social structures, responsibilities and norms – as family and community ties of loyalty, friendship and support break down or are irretrievably lost. The changes will affect especially some of the most vulnerable members of*

society: children separated from their families, often traumatised by war and sexual abuse; old people left without material and other help by the loss of their families and traditional community systems of support; and many widows with young children to care for and without financial help.^{clxv}

The United Nations has been deeply involved with the issue of reconstruction of the post conflict zones. Specifically, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been drafting documents^{clxvi} and trying to implement solutions regarding their scope and their field of expertise. In 2015, Security Council has declared that peacebuilding in the post-conflict zones is of critical importance for sustainable peace and development.^{clxvii}

“Building lasting peace in war-torn societies is among the most daunting of challenges for global peace and security. Peacebuilding requires sustained international support for national efforts across the broadest range of activities – monitoring ceasefires; demobilizing and reintegrating combatants; assisting the return of refugees and displaced persons; helping organize and monitor elections of a new government; supporting justice and security sector reform; enhancing human rights protections and fostering reconciliation after past atrocities.”^{clxviii}

This excerpt taken from Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the General Assembly’s official website explains why do the international community needs DISEC to involve with the issue. Peacebuilding and reconstruction requires more than a carefully planned economy and economic aid from other nations.

IV. Conclusion

The reconstruction of post-conflict zones is relatively a very recent topic, in which there is significant amount of development however there is still a lot of room for improvement. The guide divides the topic into basic three parts: Political, economic and social reconstruction. Obviously political and military reconstruction which will be establishing a strong rule of law, a functioning

government, and create a secure region seems the most important of them all. On the other hand, it should be remembered that a political and military reestablishment and restructuring will only be useful if these developments are followed by the other two. Moreover, both the number of conflicts around the world and the nature of the problem itself do not allow ad-hoc solutions. There are hundreds of conflict zones and hundreds of post-conflict zones therefore it would be unwise to approach each of them separately in theoretical manners. However, there is a certain merit in trying to establish a groundwork, especially in means of security measures in post-conflict zones. This groundwork then may be interpreted and altered by field teams for its specific purposes. DISEC seems to be the most viable committee to complete such a task. First of all, the General Assembly's democratic structure will allow the involvement of the local community to the decision making and the execution process. Secondly, in means of priority it has been clearly stated that political and military restructuring is of utmost importance therefore DISEC once again becomes suitable for undertaking such a mission. It is also clear that DISEC, as it has been done in many other occasions will seek for collaboration with the other body and branches of United Nations and also other organizations.

V. Points That a Resolution Should Cover

- In what ways do the post-conflict zones needs differ than the regions that are currently conflict zones?
- What would be the fastest and the most effective method of reaching a secure post-conflict zone in means of military?
- Shall United Nations be seeking any other organization's help during the reconstruction processes? If an affirmative answer is to be given, what should be these organizations or institutions?

- Vulnerability of some social groups could be used as an excuse for granting some social groups unfair or exaggerated rights, what could be done to ensure that the social reconstruction is done fair and equally?
- Are there any other potential ways to involve the local community to the reconstruction and restructuring processes?
- How could the balance between the United Nations sphere of influence and the responsibilities of the local authorities be established?
- What could be done to provide a post-conflict zone with a long term peace and harmony? Should there be a separate mechanism for this to be achieved or would the current precautions be enough?
- Is there any other aspect which should be on the scope of DISEC, other than the political, military, social and economic ones?

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